Wildcards on cert host checking
Gary E. Miller
gem at rellim.com
Wed Feb 13 23:05:56 UTC 2019
Yo Hal!
On Wed, 13 Feb 2019 14:52:35 -0800
Hal Murray via devel <devel at ntpsec.org> wrote:
> Gary said:
> >> Amy reason to allow or prohibit them?
> > Do you mean the option to reject certs where the cert name
> > is: *.example.com?
>
> > Do you mean for client or server cert checking?
>
> I'm interested in the case where the client is checking the cert from
> the server.
Well, in that case, a MUST. Many large server farms are too lazy to
get individual certs for the individual hosts. They come and go too
quickly to be micro-managed. That just get a wildcard cert.
> OpenSSL doesn't default to requiring a cert or checking it. You have
> to check it explicitly, and if you want to verify that the cert came
> from the right place you have to give OpenSSL a hostname to check.
> That same area of the API has an option to disable wildcards.
So, a simple switch. If someone can afford a wildcard cert, you
can pretty much bet it is legit.
Firefox accidently broke wildcard certs a while back, and that was
not pretty. Also, RFC2818 pretty much requies it:
"Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
[RFC2459]. If more than one identity of a given type is present
in the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in
any one of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain
the wildcard character * which is considered to match any single
domain name component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches
foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not
bar.com."
RGDS
GARY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary E. Miller Rellim 109 NW Wilmington Ave., Suite E, Bend, OR 97703
gem at rellim.com Tel:+1 541 382 8588
Veritas liberabit vos. -- Quid est veritas?
"If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it." - Lord Kelvin
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