[Git][NTPsec/ntpsec][master] Move standrds conformance to a new page of its own.
Eric S. Raymond
gitlab at mg.gitlab.com
Sun Feb 17 23:18:11 UTC 2019
Eric S. Raymond pushed to branch master at NTPsec / ntpsec
Commits:
b404c099 by Eric S. Raymond at 2019-02-17T23:17:22Z
Move standrds conformance to a new page of its own.
- - - - -
3 changed files:
- docs/index.adoc
- + docs/standards.adoc
- docs/warp.adoc
Changes:
=====================================
docs/index.adoc
=====================================
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ best to use only the HTML and manpages that come with your
distribution.
For differences between NTPsec and legacy versions, see
-link:ntpsec.html[this summary].
+link:ntpsec.html[this summary]. For details on relevant
+RFCs and standards, see link:standards.html[here].
[[platforms]]
== Supported platforms
=====================================
docs/standards.adoc
=====================================
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+= Standards Conformance
+include::html.include[]
+
+== Table of Contents
+
+* link:#standards-overview[Overview of relevant standards]
+* link:#against5905[Divergences from RFC 5905]
+* link:#against2030[Divergences from RFC 2030]
+
+[[standards-overview]]
+== Overview of relevant standards
+
+The principal standard informing the NTPsec software is
+https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5905[RFC 5905: Network Time Protocol
+Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification].
+
+SNTP is specified by https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2030[RFC 2030:
+Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4 for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI].
+
+Extension fields are described by
+https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5905[RFC 7822: Network Time Protocol
+Version 4 (NTPv4) Extension Fields].
+
+NTPsec has entirely dropped conformance with the Autokey feature
+described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5905[RFC 5906]. Autokey
+never quite worked, and the design was unstable enough that if there
+was ever actually a time when it fully conformed to its RFC that span
+must have been pretty short.
+
+Older NTP RFCs such as https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1305[RFC 1305]
+are no longer relevant.
+
+https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5297.txt[RFC 5297] describes the
+authenticated encryption used in Network Time Security
+key exchanges.
+
+[[against5905]]
+== Divergences from RFC 5905
+
+Code conformance was never quite exact even before the NTPsec fork.
+In this section we attempt to list divergences. This list is probably
+not exhaustive.
+
+Modes 5 (Broadcast) and 6 (Broadcast client) are no longer implemented
+in NTPsec, as they were impossible to secure. Mode 1 (Symmetric
+Active) is no longer implemented; such packets are treated as ordinary
+client (mode 3) packets. Mode 2 (Symmetric Passive) is still distinct
+from mode 3 but its only effect is on initial poll interval.
+
+In figure 8 of section 7.3, 128 bits (16 octets, corresponding to an
+MD5 or AES-CMAC digest) is not the only possible length for the MAC. This was
+a pre-NTPsec change present in NTP Classic versions after 2010.
+
+NTPsec conforms to the
+https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ntp-data-minimization/[NTP
+Client Data Minimization] draft RFC, which changes the client-side
+generation of some packet headers.
+
+NTPsec also conforms to the
+https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ntp-mac/[MAC for NTP]
+draft RFC, implementing AES-CMAC (128 bits).
+
+The table of reference identifiers in Figure 12 is largely obsolete
+and somewhat incomplete relative to the code.
+
+In the table of KISS codes (Figure 13), only RATE still exists and is
+implemented in NTPsec; others proved unnecessary or (in the cases of
+DENY and RSTR) outright dangerous. INIT and STEP are no lonkrt KoD types
+but persist as peer statuses that may be reported by {ntpqman}/{ntpmon}.
+
+The continuing relevance of much of Appendix A is doubtful.
+
+[[against2030]]
+== Divergences from RFC 2030
+
+In the packet-format illustration of section 4 (NTP Message Format)
+128 is not the only possible bit length for a MAC. However, this
+field is not shipped in SNTP operation, so the flaw is theoretical.
+
+Some packet mode values are, as previously noted, no longer
+implemented. Many External Reference Source types are obsolete.
+Broadcast, multicast and anycast modes are no longer implemented.
+
+'''''
+
+Include::includes/footer.adoc[]
=====================================
docs/warp.adoc
=====================================
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ include::includes/external.adoc[]
* link:#intro[Introduction and Overview]
* link:#scale[NTP Timescale and Data Formats]
* link:#arch[Architecture and Algorithms]
-* link:#standards[Standards Conformance]
'''''
@@ -186,77 +185,6 @@ Research Project] page. For additional information on statistical
principles and performance metrics, see the link:stats.html[Performance
Metrics] page.
-[[standards]]
-== Standards Conformance
-
-The principal standard informing the NTPsec software is
-https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5905[RFC 5905].
-
-Extension fields are described by
-https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5905[RFC 7822].
-
-Older NTP RFCs such as https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1305[RFC 1305]
-are no longer relevant.
-
-Note that NTPsec has entirely dropped conformance with
-https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5905[RFC 5906]. Autokey never quite
-worked, and the design was unstable enough that if there was ever
-actually a time when it fully conformed to its RFC that span must have
-been pretty short.
-
-https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5297.txt[RFC 5297] describes the
-authenticated encryption used in Network Time Security
-key exchanges.
-
-https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2030.txt[RFC 2030] describes
-Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) version 4.
-
-=== Divergences from RFC 5905
-
-Code conformance was never quite exact even before the NTPsec fork.
-In this section we attempt to list divergences. This list is probably
-not exhaustive.
-
-Modes 5 (Broadcast) and 6 (Broadcast client) are no longer implemented
-in NTPsec, as they were impossible to secure. Mode 1 (Symmetric
-Active) is no longer implemented; such packets are treated as ordinary
-client (mode 3) packets. Mode 2 (Symmetric Passive) is still distinct
-from mode 3 but its only effect is on initial poll interval.
-
-In figure 8 of section 7.3, 128 bits (16 octets, corresponding to an
-MD5 or AES-CMAC digest) is not the only possible length for the MAC. This was
-a pre-NTPsec change present in NTP Classic versions after 2010.
-
-NTPsec conforms to the
-https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ntp-data-minimization/[NTP
-Client Data Minimization] draft RFC, which changes the client-side
-generation of some packet headers.
-
-NTPsec also conforms to the
-https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ntp-mac/[MAC for NTP]
-draft RFC, implementing AES-CMAC (128 bits).
-
-The table of reference identifiers in Figure 12 is largely obsolete
-and somewhat incomplete relative to the code.
-
-In the table of KISS codes (Figure 13), only RATE still exists and is
-implemented in NTPsec; others proved unnecessary or (in the cases of
-DENY and RSTR) outright dangerous. INIT and STEP are no lonkrt KoD types
-but persist as peer statuses that may be reported by {ntpqman}/{ntpmon}.
-
-The continuing relevance of much of Appendix A is doubtful.
-
-=== Divergences from RFC 2030
-
-In the packet-format illustration of section 4 (NTP Message Format)
-128 is not the only possible bit length for a MAC. However, this
-field is not shipped in SNTP operation, so the flaw is theoretical.
-
-Some packet mode values are, as previously noted, no longer
-implemented. Many External Reference Source types are obsolete.
-Multicast and anycast modes are no longer implemented.
-
-
'''''
Include::includes/footer.adoc[]
View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.com/NTPsec/ntpsec/commit/b404c0997b99be43044c8a60bcccd098d6f3462a
--
View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.com/NTPsec/ntpsec/commit/b404c0997b99be43044c8a60bcccd098d6f3462a
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