I'm giving up on seccomp

[Gary E. Miller]

Yo Eric!

On Wed, 2 Sep 2020 20:35:38 -0400
"Eric S. Raymond" <esr at thyrsus.com> wrote:

> Gary E. Miller via devel <devel at ntpsec.org>:
> > Buffer overruns are just one way a program might make unexpected
> > system calls.  Even if you can guarantee that a Go program could
> > never be maliciously corrupted externally, you can never guarantee
> > that the Go program can not be trojaned.  
> 
> Everything is cost gradients.
> 
> Yes, a Go program could be Trojaned, but (a) that is far less likely
> than a buffer overrun is in C, and (b) there are reasonably efficient
> auditing methods to detect Trojanning, good enough that even static
> analyzers lilke Coverity and LGTM can usually catch them by looking
> for shellouts.  Syscall blocking is not really the best-fit tool for
> defense against this kind of attack.

No one said the love of seccomp made any sense.  But you don't take a
security blanket away from an infant.

RGDS
GARY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary E. Miller Rellim 109 NW Wilmington Ave., Suite E, Bend, OR 97703
	gem at rellim.com  Tel:+1 541 382 8588

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    "If you can't measure it, you can't improve it." - Lord Kelvin
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