What's left to doo on NTS

[Gary E. Miller]

Yo Daniel!

On Sat, 2 Mar 2019 09:40:30 -0500
Daniel Franke <dfoxfranke at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 11:39 PM Gary E. Miller via devel
> <devel at ntpsec.org> wrote:
> > Not complete security, but at least encryption.  And there are
> > levels of validation.  If you are off net, you can't completely
> > validate the cert, but you can partially validate it.  Maybe you
> > would want to pin it.  
> 
> Encryption doesn't work without authentication; a MitM can cause you
> to negotiate keys with *him* instead of the endpoint you think you're
> communicating with.

Yes, but you seriously reduce the attack time window.  Instead of
a possible MitM every few seconds, you need to grab the one time the
cookies are shared.

> You can skip the notBefore/notAfter constraints under the
> circumstances described in the RFC.

Which should be a config option.

> Otherwise, either do full
> validation or don't bother with NTS at all. Pinning counts as full
> validation.

I'd be happy if we had per host pinning instead of "noval".

RGDS
GARY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary E. Miller Rellim 109 NW Wilmington Ave., Suite E, Bend, OR 97703
	gem at rellim.com  Tel:+1 541 382 8588

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    "If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it." - Lord Kelvin
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