The key-manahement argument

[James Browning]

On Mon, Jan 21, 2019, 9:20 AM Achim Gratz via devel <devel at ntpsec.org wrote:

> Hal Murray via devel writes:
> >> My thought about how to enable NTS for the pool would involve requiring
> a SRV
> >> record lookup for NTS-KE
> >
> > That SRV lookup could return multiple names.  Each would point to a
> separate
> > NTS-KE server.
> >
> > An alternative approach would be to extend the NTS-KE protocol to
> support
> > multiple answers.
>
> No, the client needs to ask multiple times.  Otherwise each association
> for that TLS session would get the same S2C and C2S keys and that's a
> no-no.
>

Not seeing a viable exploit ATM. One would need to get a server in the
pool, a ridiculous amount of computer power and/or an exploit against AES
and/or ChaCha as well as acesss to the packet stream of a given host which
puts it out of the range of almost anyone except *no such agency*.

>
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