NTS keys as I understand them

[Gary E. Miller]

Yo Achim!

On Tue, 15 Jan 2019 19:16:54 +0100
Achim Gratz via devel <devel at ntpsec.org> wrote:

> Hal Murray via devel writes:
> >> While I don't know what the rationale was for the RFC, it still
> >> makes sense to provide a client with enough cookies so it can fire
> >> off the initial burst w/o re-keying even if all responses get
> >> lost.   
> >
> > The NTS-KE section has a SHOULD return 8 keys, but only 1 is
> > required.  
> 
> An RFC has very specific language (it's explained at the start).
> "SHOULD" in all caps in this case essentially means that NTS-KE is
> strongly expected to serve 8 initial cookies, but a client must not
> fail if it doesn't.  That's not a pass for implementing an NTS-KE
> which generally delivers only a single cookie or some other number
> below eight.

Umm, who are you arguing against?  Did I miss someone suggest what you
are objecting to?  I see no message referenced in your email to point
me at the OP of an idea like that.

RGDS
GARY
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Gary E. Miller Rellim 109 NW Wilmington Ave., Suite E, Bend, OR 97703
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