Against certain proposed TLS client-side options

[Gary E. Miller]

Yo Richard!

On Sat, 2 Feb 2019 20:52:33 -0600
Richard Laager via devel <devel at ntpsec.org> wrote:

> On 2/2/19 7:25 PM, Richard Laager via devel wrote:
> > # Requiring a bounded set of audited TLS versions
> > # (the DOD STIG scenario, unverified as to actual requirement)
> > tlsmin 1.2 tlsmax 1.3
> > OR
> > tlsversions "1.3"  
> 
> This should be:
> 
> tlsmin 1.2 tlsmax 1.3
> OR
> tlsversions "1.2 1.3"

Which would have broken when SSL became TLS, and will break when TLS
becomes XXX.

Remeber the failures of the past.  Do not repeat them.

RGDS
GARY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary E. Miller Rellim 109 NW Wilmington Ave., Suite E, Bend, OR 97703
	gem at rellim.com  Tel:+1 541 382 8588

	    Veritas liberabit vos. -- Quid est veritas?
    "If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it." - Lord Kelvin
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