Cert pinning

Gary E. Miller gem at rellim.com
Mon Apr 1 01:58:45 UTC 2019

Yo Richard!

On Sun, 31 Mar 2019 18:47:35 -0500
Richard Laager via devel <devel at ntpsec.org> wrote:

> This option would allow Gary's scenario to validate, without needing
> to trust that root system-wide. He would presumably then eliminate
> "noval" from that configuration line.

Failing to match a root CA in the local cert is only one of many ways
that a cert can fail to validate.  Before noval can be removed there
must be a workaround for all of them.  There are also checks for
validity dates, certificate revocation, hostname matching, etc.

> 2) If we want more, implement some form of pinning. As the intention
> of pinning is to further restrict the trust anchors, this would be in
> addition to normal validation, not instead of it.

Why?  Many other protocols use pinning sometimes to suplement a
cert chain, sometimes in addition to it.  No reason not to support
both options.

> The pinning options
> would be mutually exclusive of "noval" to keep the implementation
> straightforward and to help prevent people from shooting themselves in
> the foot.

We should be so lucky...

Gary E. Miller Rellim 109 NW Wilmington Ave., Suite E, Bend, OR 97703
	gem at rellim.com  Tel:+1 541 382 8588

	    Veritas liberabit vos. -- Quid est veritas?
    "If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it." - Lord Kelvin
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