Deciding what modes to keep.

[Gary E. Miller]

Yo Daniel!

On Fri, 30 Sep 2016 15:46:49 -0400
Daniel Franke <dfoxfranke at gmail.com> wrote:

> On 9/30/16, Gary E. Miller <gem at rellim.com> wrote:
> > So any upward extensible is fine, but trivial back-compatibility is
> > essential.  
> 
> So what do you propose?

I'm not there yet I do not graps what you are proposing yet to
counter in detail.

> We currently have insecure defaults.

Yes.  But even though the NTPsec defaults are the same as NTP Classic
defaults the NTPsec implementation is still more secure.  Let not the
best be the enemy of better.

> This must
> change, and *tautologically*, such a change necessarily involves
> breaking backward compatibility somewhere.

Or rather: sometime.  I would add upward compatible keywords that
add more security, and warnings to encourage people to change
their ntp.conf for the better.

Only after critical usership is gained would I start to impose
on users by default.  Even if NTPsec is great, if the effort to
convert from ne daemon to another is more than very sight, users
will not change.

Sort like giving people a free trial of soemthing, then after they get
complacent yyyou stick it to them.  :-)


> I am proposing what I think
> is smallest and least invasive of all possible changes which achieve
> secure defaults. Do you disagree with this judgement?

Yeah.  Imposing security will fail.  Encouraging security may
succeed.  Users do not particularly like software that acts
superior to them.

RGDS
GARY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary E. Miller Rellim 109 NW Wilmington Ave., Suite E, Bend, OR 97703
	gem at rellim.com  Tel:+1 541 382 8588
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